Comments on "PM(2.5) mortality in long-term prospective cohort studies: cause-effect or statistical association?". by Loomis, D et al.
lence
Comments on "PM2.5 Mortality in Long-term
Prospective Cohort Studies:
Cause-Effect or Statistical
Association?'
Most models ofhow science works propose
that competition between ideas contributes
to the advancement of knowledge.
Criticism ofscientific work plays a part in
facilitating such competition by exposing
the strengths and weaknesses ofrival expla-
nations, encouraging debate, and suggesting
alternatives. Nevertheless, not all criticism
has equalvalue to the scientific process.
In a review ofepidemiologic studies on
fine particles and mortality that appeared
recently in EHP, Gamble (1) charged that
the two major studies on this topic (2,3)
mayhave been compromised bybias, yet he
offered no serious effort to evaluate the
alleged errors with the same standards of
rigordemanded oftheoriginal studies.
For example, in Gamble's (1) claim that
the study findings are compromised by the
ecologic fallacy, he failed to address two
important issues. First, the major prospec-
tive studies of fine particles and mortality
are not classical ecologic designs because
only air pollution exposures are measured
on the aggregate level; the outcome and
potential confounders are based on individ-
ual-level measurements. Thus the biases
stemming from the ecologic fallacy do not
apply to these studies. Instead, these should
be viewed as individual level studies in
which exposure is measured with error (4).
The calculations in Gamble's Table 2 (1)
are erroneously portrayed as demonstrating
the ecologic fallacy. Instead they appear to
present strong evidence of a supralinear
dose-response relationship between parti-
cles and mortality. This type of dose
response would be expected ifthere existed
a subset with much greater susceptibility,
e.g., a bimodal distrubution ofsusceptibili-
ty. Second, the inference that the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
and others have drawn from the studies'
results is logically consistent with evidence
based on exposure measured at the group
level. The correct inference is that individu-
als living in communities with high air pol-
lution levels have a higher risk of dying
than people living in communities with low
pollution levels and, therefore, that lower-
ing community-wide air pollution levels
should reduce community mortality rates.
Such a policy is a logical and efficient
means ofminimizing thehealth impact ofa
widespread exposure (5).
Even when the criticism focuses on spe-
cific factors that might explain the results of
the studies, it does not consistently address
the potential magnitude and direction of
alleged biases. For example, Gamble (1)
conduded that lung function is a probable
confounder ofthe observed relative risk for
PM2.5 because the average lung function of
the Six Cities cohort differs by city and
because reduced lung function is a risk fac-
tor for mortality. However, neither the text
nor Gamble's Figure 3 (1) explicidyidentify
possible ranges of confounding that this
variable may have produced in the relative
risk estimate of 1.26 derived in the original
Six Cities Study. Gamble's Figure 3C shows
that the average forced expiratoryvolume in
1 sec (FEV1) differs by approximately 0.1 L
between the cohort members in the dirtiest
and deanest cities. In light ofthe cited 1.52
relative riskestimate for total mortality asso-
ciated with a 1-L decrease in FEV1, it is dif-
ficult to imagine how adjustment for a
FEVI difference one order of magnitude
smaller could explain the observed associa-
tion (6). Perhaps more importantly,
reduced lung function could be on the
causal pathway between chronic exposure to
particles and mortality, such that any
adjustment forFEVI would introduce bias.
Sedentary lifestyle was posited as another
potential confounder; however, Gamble (1)
presented no evidence to suggest that suffi-
cient differences in sedentary lifestyle
among the six cities could account for the
observed particle/mortality association.
Gamble (1) raised further doubts about
cohort studies of mortality and fine parti-
cles by reviewing lists of criteria for epi-
demiologic studies (7,8). Hill never
intended that his standards be used to
exclude evidence. In his famous 1965
paper (2), Hill wrote,
I do not believe ... that we can usefully lay down
some hard-and-fast rules of evidence that must
be obeyed before we accept cause andeffect.
Hill emphasized that guidelines can be
helpful at the margins of epidemiologic
interpretation, but the contribution ofany
particular study must be evaluated through
careful assessment of the individual facts.
Hewrote (2),
None ofmy nine viewpoints ... can be required
as a sine qua non. What they can do, with
greater or less strength, is help us to make up our
minds on thefundamental question...."
Hill's criteria appropriately would require
a careful review not of one study design,
but rather of the entire body of literature
pertaining to the hypothesis of a causal
association between air pollution exposure
and health. This literature includes experi-
mental studies in animals and clinical and
epidemiologic studies in humans, examin-
ing outcomes ranging from direct measures
oflung function to self-reported symptoms
to hospital admissions and death.
Hertz-Picciotto's (8) criteria on the use
of epidemiology in quantitative risk assess-
ment are also cited by Gamble (1), with
emphasis on their application for setting air
quality standards. In fact, Hertz-Picciotto's
framework was developed for the specific
purpose ofdassifying "individual epidemio-
logical studies as to their adequacy for use in
dose-response extrapolation" (8), not for
assessing weight ofevidence regarding causa-
tion. Gamble (1) applied these criteria to a
study design rather than individual studies;
because he characterized them as having an
ecologic design, he wrongly concluded that
the alleged design weaknesses threaten the
evidential base ofthe EPA's newPM2.5 stan-
dard. This use of Hertz-Picciotto's criteria
(8) does not reflect the spirit in which they
were intended, that is, "to have a reliable
process for making the best use ofavailable
data ..." fordose-response extrapolation.
It is appropriate to criticize epidemio-
logic findings, especially when they have
major implications for public policy, as the
studies of fine particles do. However, it is
much more helpful to evaluate the evidence
that a given type of bias did (or did not)
occur and to quantify its direction and mag-
nitude than merely to suggest it is apossibil-
ity. Sensitivity analysis is an excellent tool
for quantitative exploration of potential
biases that can be used to gauge which of
the many biases that can be envisioned are
plausible explanations for asetofresults and
which are not. The magnitude ofconfound-
ing can be calculated from several parame-
ters related to the univariate distrubution of
the postulated confounder and bivariate dis-
tributions involving the confounder, the
exposure of interest, and the outcome (9.
The kind of detailed analysis that these
techniques encourage is fundamental to
serious scientific criticism. Without these
elements, Gamble's review (1) is largely an
expression of opinion, more appropriately
published as a commentary.
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Response to Loomis et al.
I would like to address comments of
Loomis et al. about inferences drawn from
studies using group-level exposure vari-
ables, the use of the tobacco analogy, the
application of Hill's criteria for causality
(1), and the use ofthe Hertz-Picciotto cri-
teria for evaluating studies (2). Whether
the hybrid studies under discussion (3-5)
are considered partly ecological (6,7) or
individual level with exposure misclassifi-
cation, bias (ecological or otherwise) is
possible and should be checked. I hope
that these discussions will lead to more
considerations of the interplay between
outcomes and confounders measured at
the individual level and exposure measured
at the group level.
Loomis et al. suggest that the biases
stemming from the "ecologic fallacy" do
not apply to the PM25 air pollution stud-
ies because they are individual-level studies
where exposure is measured with error.
That is, by implication there is one PM
exposure variable. But as indicated by
Morgenstern (8,9), ecologic bias can arise
when the mean of a group-level exposure
variable has an effect on the individual-
level exposure. By this definition there will
be ecologic bias whenever the ecologic
exposure variable has an effect, and when
there is also an individual-level exposure
effect in addition to the ecologic exposure
effect. Unmeasured individual-level expo-
sure to PM2 from all sources can be sev-
eral orders ofmagnitude higher than ambi-
ent PM2.5 concentrations (10) because of
extensive exposure to unmeasured sources
such as tobacco and indoor combustion.
These individual-level exposures vary for
individuals within the group and con-
tribute to the individual-level risk. The
additional effect of ambient exposure
provides the group-level component that
leads to ecologic bias.
The American Cancer Society (ACS)
Study (4) and the Six Cities Study (3) sug-
gest that an increase of about 20 pg/m3
PM235 results in a 20-30% increase in total
mortality. I sought to test the consistency of
these findings by comparing risk estimates
based on group-level exposure estimates to
those based on individual-level exposure to
a similar but more thoroughly studied par-
ticulate (i.e., tobacco smoke). Applying the
models developed in these studies to tobac-
co smoke, one can predict that a 20-pg/m3
difference in ambient PM2.5 between cities
is too small to result in a measurable differ-
ence in overall mortality (6). If this is true,
the differences in mortality between cities
may be due to causes other than differences
in PM. Whether there is ecologic bias,
exposure misdassification bias operating at
the individual level, or uncontrolled bias
from other sources, the tobacco analogy
suggests that bias away from the null may
be operating in these studies.
Loomis et al. suggest that the tobacco
analogy presents "strong evidence of a
supralinear dose-response relationship
between particles and mortality." In order
to fit the data, the degree ofsupralinearity
would have to be enormous. In fact, an
increase of 19.6 pg/m3 in ambient PM2.5 and an increase of 16,000 pg/m3 from
smoking would have to both result in a
similar 20-30% increased risk (Figure 1) It
is not plausible that two increases in expo-
sure, which differ by almost three orders of
magnitude, would both produce the same
response. A more plausible inference is that
either the PM2.5 or the smoking risk esti-
mates are in error. However, I would place
more credence in the smoking relative risks
(RRs) because smoking is measured at the
individual rather than the group level, and
the smoking RRs are compatible with a
large body ofliterature.
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Figure 1. Association of total mortality with group level ambient PM25 exposure and individual level
tobacco smoke exposure. Data from the Six Cities Study (3).
&Approximately 16,000 pg/mr3.
It is not necessarily correct to infer, as
Loomis et al. do, that lowering community-
wide air pollution below existing levels will
reduce community mortality rates. In mak-
ing this inference, one assumes there is inde-
pendent evidence for a causal relationship
between ambient PM2.5 and mortality.
These studies (4,6) showed that there were
differences in total mortality, but did not
showwhy mortality was higher in cities with
higher PM25 concentrations. IfPM2.5 is the
reason for increased mortality, all important
individual risk factors must be taken into
account to a reasonable degree. Total mor-
tality has a large number ofrisk factors. It is
speculative therefore to assume, as Loomis et
al. do, that lowering PM2.5 concentrations
beyond existing levels will provide a "logical
and efficient means ofminimizing thehealth
impact of a widespread exposure," and that
the proposed cure will produce the desired
effect. The tobacco analogy provides evi-
dence against such an effect.
Loomis et al. state that the effects of
potential confounders are too small to
explain the observed associations in the
PM studies. In my paper (6) I assessed dif-
ferences in lung function and sedentary liv-
ing as two examples of possible con-
founders because some evidence was avail-
able to me. Even in these examples, indi-
vidual-level data were not available to ade-
quately estimate or adjust for these effects
(6). There are undoubtedly many other
examples such as personal lifestyle factors
or other inadequately controlled variables
that are correlated with dirty versus clean
cities or with geography. Based on the
tobacco analogy, it appears that whatever
biases are operating resulted in a large
overestimate ofthePM2.5 risk.
I agree with Loomis et al. that to apply
Hill's (1) criteria appropriately requires a
"careful review not of one study design,
but rather of the entire body of literature
pertaining to the hypothesis of a causal
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